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Abstract 
Evaluations of labour market programs and other related measures typically 
make use of observational data. This paper presents an outline for producing 
experimental data in the interest of testing a proposed measure targeted to un-
employed immigrant workers. The idea is to offer them placement services 
provided by a private recruitment company as well as by public employment 
offices. The assignment of unemployed immigrants to the two providers will be 
random and the operating conditions kept as similar as possible.  
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1 Introduction 
In Sweden, like in many other European countries, the unemployment rate re-
mains high and many newcomers to the labour market, e.g. immigrants and 
young people, struggle to find an employment. This is of course a problem for 
the job-seeker, but also for society. In Sweden a substantial number of meas-
ures has been taken or suggested in order to improve the situation. We present 
in this paper one such measure and discuss the evaluation of its impact. The 
measure is to incorporate private recruitment companies, in addition to the ex-
isting public employment offices, in the task of matching employers and immi-
grant job-seekers. The evaluation of the measure will use the principle of ran-
domisation, often thought of as a social experiment. Historically, social ex-
periments have seldom been conducted to evaluate the impact of new labour 
market policy measures, and this project could thus help in the understanding 
of social experiments as a strategy for evaluation. 
 
1.1 Background 
Relative to Swedes, job-seeking immigrants at the public employment offices 
have a considerably lower flow into employment. The transition rate is ap-
proximately 50–70 percent lower for immigrants, after adjusting for other fac-
tors known to affect unemployment duration. The median unemployment time 
is about 25 weeks for a Swede and about 40 weeks for an immigrant, who is 
seemingly identical to the Swede except for the fact that he/she is an immi-
grant. Moreover, the expected unemployment duration is about 45 weeks for a 
Swede and 75 weeks for an immigrant.
1 It can also be noted that the unem-
ployment rate among Swedes (16–64 yr.) was 5.5% in 1998, while for immi-
grants born outside the Nordic countries the corresponding rate was 19.5% 
(Wessberg, 1999). These gloomy numbers have called upon the government to 
try out whether placement services, i.e. matching employers and job-seekers, 
provided by others than the public employment office could reduce unemploy-
ment duration, and thereby the unemployment rate, for immigrants. 
To appreciate the proposed new measure for placement services, it is neces-
sary to have a basic understanding of the historical and present situation. A 
                                                      
 1 The numbers refer to newly registered job-seekers with a non-Nordic citizenship (Carling et al, 
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main characteristic of the Swedish labour market is the active policy pursued 
and executed by the public employment offices. For instance, in the interest of 
preventing long periods of open unemployment, job seekers have been put into 
government-financed or subsidised training and employment programs on a 
large scale. There are about 500 public employment offices, spread geographi-
cally over the country. Among other things they offer labour market training, 
hold registers of job-openings and monitor unemployment insurance. However, 
the principal task for the offices is to provide placement services to job seekers 
and thereby assist in keeping the unemployment rate down. Until 1993 job-
matching was a public monopoly in Sweden; legislation prevented private 
competitors to perform similar tasks. Since then hiring and recruitment compa-
nies have emerged and are growing in importance. Nonetheless, they remain 
small in job-matching compared with the public offices. On the other hand, the 
public employment offices do not, through their placement services, cover a 
great deal of the job-matches in the labour market.
2 
 
1.2 Social experiment 
The idea to try a new approach to placement services for immigrants was first 
put forward in the Budget Bill of the year 2000, in which it is stated that “the 
government will initiate the tryout of new means for job-matching”.
3 In a 
memo from the Ministry of industry, employment and communications the idea 
was further developed. A special investigator (the first author of this paper) 
was instructed to produce an outline for a social experiment in line with the in-
tentions laid out in the memo. The outline has later been discussed at meetings 
with the Ministry of industry, employment and communications, the Ministry 
of finance, the National Labour market board and the Office of labour market 
policy evaluation. 
                                                      
2 The public employment offices’ estimated share of vacancies is about 1/3, meaning that in 
every third case of all hirings, the vacancy was reported to an office. The remaining 2/3 cover 
formal channels, such as newspapers, and informal channels such as hiring of previous employ-
ers (i.e. re-employment) and other contacts. Internal recruitment within the company was not 
considered in calculating the share of vacancies. Another measure of market share is the fraction 
of job seekers that found information about their job at the public employment office; in a survey 
of unemployed persons who had later found a job, 22 % reported that the job came through a 
public employment office. (Ams Utredningsenhet, 1999) 
3 In the Budget Bill, it is also explicitly stated that the target group for any such measure is im-
migrant workers. The strong interest in this particular group of workers is linked to their poor la-
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The discussion relating to the memo and the outline has produced the fol-
lowing basic design: the performance in placement services of a private firm 
will be compared to public offices. This will be done in several sites. In each 
site an office of the private recruitment and hiring firm (below called private 
office) will compete with an office of the public employment service (below 
called public office). The private offices will thus offer placement services like 
the public office. The experiment will only include mediating jobs to external 
employers (Recruitment to the own company will thus not be part of the ex-
periment). Moreover, the experiment will be controlled to allow safe conclu-
sions about differences in placement service ability between the private com-
pany and the public office.  
Controlled experiments have the advantage of placing the competitors on an 
equal base, making the comparison fair. These can be contrasted to uncon-
trolled situations where there is a risk of unfair selection of the subjects studied. 
If, for instance, the unemployed themselves were to choose whether to use the 
public or the private alternative, then there is no guarantee that those choosing 
the private alternative would be comparable to those choosing the public one. 
This problem is eliminated in a well-conducted experiment where the sujects 
are randomised. 
However, in Sweden, as well as in other European countries, controlled so-
cial experiments within the labour market area have been few. The only known 
Swedish social experiment was performed in the town Eskilstuna in the 70’s 
and it was used to determine the effect of intensified placement service (Björk-
lund & Regnér, 1996). In the US, on the other hand, many states use this meth-
odology to evaluate the expected effect of new planned labour market pro-
grams (Katz, et al. 1998). 
It can be noted that a controlled experiment is the most popular methodol-
ogy in many other fields, such as medicine, psychology and science, whenever 
a hypothesis is to be tested. 
 
1.3 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis is that a private office faster and to a larger extent can mediate 
jobs to unemployed immigrants than the public employment office can.  
The hypothesis can be motivated by differences between private and public 
offices regarding ways of organising their placement services. It can also be ar-
gued that the staffing activity conducted by the private offices generates addi-
tional knowledge about employers, e.g. qualification requirements for person-IFAU –– Public or private job matching for immigrant workers   6
nel and need for future recruitment. Since the public employment offices only 
have a market share of approximately 1/3 of vacancies, as described in section 
1.1, it appears plausible that private offices could provide job seekers with ad-
ditional information about vacancies.  
 
1.4 Organisation 
The experiment will be planned and conducted by a study secretariat. The se-
cretariat will consist of researchers from the Office for labour market policy 
evaluation and an governmental administrator with good knowledge about the 
Swedish labour market institutions. The study secretariat will be responsible 
for designing the experiment in a way (i) to make it feasible and (ii) to make 
sure that firm conclusions about the hypothesis can be drawn. A supervising 
group will be attached to the secretariat. It will consist of representatives from 
the Ministry of finance and the Ministry of industry, employment and commu-
nications. A decision to end the experiment prematurely is made jointly by the 
supervising group and the study secretariat, or by the government withdrawing 
the task. 
To clarify all details the experiment will be described in a protocol. When 
the protocol is written a workshop will be held, giving acknowledged research-
ers in the field an opportunity to scrutinize the protocol. After the workshop all 
theoretical issues should be well thought-out. 
 
 
2 Experimental design  
2.1 Essential features of the experiment  
Public and private offices will be compared regarding ability in placement ser-
vice. To ensure that both actors have equal opportunities regarding the job 
seekers they are to serve, the experiment will be controlled. Allocation of job 
seekers between the two competitors will be done using randomisation. The 
randomisation will be pre-stratified on characteristics presumed to have a large 
influence on the outcome. This will improve the power of discriminating be-
tween the competitors.
4 
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It might be the case that the two competitors are stimulated to perform bet-
ter in the experimental setting than they would otherwise. To estimate this ef-
fect for the public offices there will also be an external control group. It will 
consist of public offices not participating in the experiment. Since these can be 
followed in the Labour market board Event database, there should be no need 
for extensive surveillance using questionnaires. Their performance should, 
thus, not be strongly affected by the fact that they are used as controls, which 
makes them feasible. 
For the private company, on the other hand, there is no relevant external 
control group. This might give the private company the opportunity to allocate 
additional resources to the offices under study, thus resulting in an unfair com-
parison. To avoid this, three steps will be taken. First, job-seekers will be asked 
to estimate the quantity of resources used them. Second, the offices in the study 
will be compared to other offices (in terms of profit and other performance 
measures) over time to check for unexpected short-term losses due to extensive 
resources to the job-seekers. Third, it is desired the experiment is defined as a 
project within the organizations, in that seperate books are held. 
There should be equal opportunities between the competitors regarding in-
formation. Since there is a law forcing employers to report vacancies to the 
public office
5, it is necessary to give the private company access to this infor-
mation.  
There will also be equal opportunities between the competitors regarding 
economic resources. The private company will, thus, be given compensation 
for each job seeker allocated to them. The amount will be calculated from the 
accounts of the public offices, and will thus be the mean cost of placement ser-
vices to this category of job seeker. 
   
2.2 Sites  
The experiment will be conducted in at least three towns in Sweden. The rea-
son for suggesting more than one town is to avoid too much dependence on cir-
cumstances that are specific to a certain public or private office. This also gives 
the opportunity to study the effect of the experiment in sites that have different 
characteristics.  
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For a town to be considered, it will need to fulfil a number of criteria: (i) It 
should have a well-diversified economy. (ii) The recruitment and hiring com-
pany should already be established. (iii) A sufficient number of unemployed 
fulfilling the inclusion criteria (see section 2.4) should be available.  
 
2.3 Placement period  
The placement period for each participant will be limited to five months from 
randomisation. The time is decided upon by, on the one hand, the need for the 
placement service to run long enough to have a measurable impact. On the 
other hand, the participating job seekers must not be deprived of the possibility 
to benefit from active labour market politics, such as employment training and 
recruitment subsidies, for too long. Of importance for the balance is that the 
jobs should not only be mediated, but the job-seeker should also enter on his 
duties during, or immediately after, the placement period. The placement pe-
riod should thus not be too short. By including only job seekers that are consid-
ered able to accept a job immediately (see sector 2.4 item (iii) below) and thus 
are not considered in immediate need of labour market training, the loss of this 
possibility will be less important. Five months is considered an appropriate 
placement period balancing these two desires. 
 
2.4 Participants 
The intention is to apply the measure to immigrant workers. However, it is 
necessary to be more precise about who will be offered to participate in the ex-
periment. The following six criteria define the target population for the experi-
ment.  
 
(i) Born in a non-Nordic country. The experiment is intended only for non-
Nordic immigrants.
6 The major problem in the Swedish labour market is 
among those who have emigrated from a non-Nordic country. There is surely a 
great deal of heterogeneity within this group, but the formal knowledge about 
this is very limited, and therefore the experiment is directed towards non-
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(ii) 20–64 years old. 
 
(iii) Ready and able to take on a job immediately. It is only for those who 
are considered able to take on a job immediately that it is ethically reasonable 
to withhold the opportunity to participate in labour market programs over a 
course of five-month. "Able to take on a job immediately" is defined by the 
public offices, using the Labour market board classification system.  
 
(iv) Newly registered at the Employment office. To obtain firm conclusions 
about the effect, it must work in isolation of other factors. For instance, if job 
seekers with a long, previous, registration period at the employment offices 
were to participate in the experiment, potential effects could not be unambigu-
ously attributed to differences in placement service efficacy. Including this 
group in the experiment would mean that job-seekers allocated to the public of-
fice would remain with their previous service, whilst those allocated to the pri-
vate company would change from one service to another. A difference in out-
come between the two competitors would then possibly be due to the change it-
self rather than to a difference in the performance of the two competitors. Us-
ing only newly registered job seekers places the two competitors on equal 
terms. Moreover, it would be complicated to construct an external comparison 
group from other databases, such as the Labour market board Event database, if 
the target population included others than the new-registered. Another impor-
tant circumstance is that labour market programs often would be considered 
within a five-month period for those with a long ongoing registration period. 
Participation would then be forced to end for these people.  
Even if we can assume that the problems in the labour market are most se-
vere for those who are not only immigrant, but also long-term registered, the 
arguments given above speak unambiguously in favour of restricting the popu-
lation to include only new-registered job seekers. Knowledge about which 
methods are most effective in mediating jobs to new-registered immigrants 
should also give guidance about how long-term registered immigrants can be 
given assistance in finding jobs. Shortened unemployment spells should also 
result in a lower long-term unemployment. Moreover, long-term unemploy-
ment will be studied for the two competitors in the long-term evaluation, see 
section 3.2.2. 
Finally, the low rate of flow into work among immigrants is a general im-
migrant problem, see section 1.1. Even highly educated immigrants, who might 
be underrepresented among the long-term unemployed, have worse labour 
market prospects than native Swedes. By letting the experiment include new-IFAU –– Public or private job matching for immigrant workers   10
registered job-seekers, the whole population of unemployed immigrants can be 
studied, and it will be possible to draw more general conclusions about meas-
ures needed for immigrants seeking job. 
 
(v) Not de-registered from public employment offices lately. This criterion 
excludes job applicants with a short work spell in the regular labour market fol-
lowing a previous period of unemployment. These job-seekers are, like long-
term unemployed, likely to be considered in need of labour market programs.  
 
 (vi) Informed consent. Requiring an informed consent is a way of making 
sure that all participants are all fully aware that participation is voluntary, and 
what participation implies. This is thought to decrease the dropout rate and in-
crease compliance. Furthermore, labour market training is not allowed during 
the experimental period, which may affect the participants’ labour market 
prospects. Hence, it is, for ethical reasons, necessary that the participants are 
aware of this fact. Finally, sensitive information about the participants will be 
registered and Swedish legislation accordingly requires informed consent. 
 
2.5 Effectuation  
Job-seekers who fulfil the criteria for participation in the experiment are identi-
fied upon registration at the public office. Randomisation is then performed 
immediately by phoning a randomisation centre. Participants are registered at 
both the randomisation centre and at the public office, giving the secretariat an 
opportunity to monitor the conduct. The private company is then immediately 
to be informed about job seekers that have been allocated to them. During the 
following five-month placement period all job-seekers are registered in the data 
system provided by the Labour market board, and accessible at each employ-
ment offices, according to normal procedures. The private company will have 
access to the data system via a contact person at the public office. The job-
seekers will also be followed using questionnaires. By using questionnaires the 
secretariat can monitor the quality of the data in the database, and additional 
data usually not asked for can be gathered.  
Crossover, i.e. subjects switching from one competitor to another, is likely 
to occur during the course of the experiment. This form of non-compliance 
may cause difficulties in the analysis of the experiment. The following princi-
ples will apply to participants in the experiment 
•   Participants who have been randomised to receive placement service from 
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office, and by doing so in this sense end their participation in the experi-
ment. They will however still be followed, and the data will used in evalua-
tions, see section 3.2.1. 
•   A participant who has been randomised to receive placement service from 
the public office will if she so wishes be able to seek job through a private 
recruitment company at her own expense. Information about this will be 
gathered, but participants will beside this be followed according to normal 
procedures. 
The following will apply to the private and public offices  
•   The private company will not employ participants (through staffing) during 
the study period. The private company is thus deprived of a possibility that 
the public office does not have; thus the two competitors are given equal 
opportunities.  
•   Public office and private offices will only offer participants placement ser-
vice during the placement time. No one will thus be able to participate in 
any labour market program during the placement period. Because the prob-
ability of employment is likely to be affected by participation in active la-
bour market programmes, we hereby eliminate differences in outcome that 
is due to a different use of these measures.  
 
 
3 Evaluation issues 
3.1 Follow-up 
An implementation study will be performed one year after the experiment 
has begun. Interim analyses will also be performed during the running of the 
experiment, for ethical reasons. These are done to ensure that the private com-
pany is not performing essentially worse then the public office. The interim 
analyses will be co-ordinated with the implementation study. 
The assignment will be given to a person independent of the organisations 
that have initiated or are effectuating the experiment. The purpose of the im-
plementation study is to find out whether the experiment is conducted in accor-
dance with the protocol, in other respects in a desired manner, and that the con-
duct has not induced complications that will cast strong doubts about the out-
come of the experiment. For this to be possible, the study secretariat will make 
all data available to those who are conducting the implementation study. A re-IFAU –– Public or private job matching for immigrant workers   12




3.2.1 Short-term effects 
An evaluation will be performed after the active phase of the experiment. It 
will focus on the short-time effects of the experiment, defined as exits to work 
within five months from randomisation
7. The performance in job-matching and 
placement services is thus compared. The evaluation will primarily be done ac-
cording to the ”Intention to treat” principle - the outcome will be evaluated for 
all randomised job-seekers irrespective of whether they complied to the ran-
domised allocation or not.
8 The outcome of the experiment will also be exam-
ined in subgroups of the population, using information such as year of immi-
gration, country of birth, working experience and education. 
The assignment will be given to a person independent of the organisations 
that have initiated or are running the experiment. The study secretariat will 
make all data available to those who are conducting the evaluation. A report 
will then be produced and submitted to the reference group and the study secre-
tariat. 
 
3.2.2 Long-term effects 
Five years after the initiation of the experiment, an evaluation of the long-term 
effects will be performed
9. The purpose is to see whether the short-time effects 
remain, which would not necessarily be the case if there were a difference in 
quality of jobs mediated between the public office and the private company. An 
example of differences in quality is the frequency of temporary jobs. The 
                                                      
7 The following parameters will be estimated and used as outcome measures: proportion of job-
matches, total sum of hours of the offered jobs, and the duration of unemployment until a job-
match. Additionally, data on how participants view their jobs will be gathered. 
8 The most important reason for applying this principle is to avoid giving the private company 
incentives to push back the least employable subjects to the public office. This will generally 
lead to a conservative estimate of the effect of the measure. However, it might be that the public 
office chooses to provide these subjects a less intensive help, making the comparison invalid. 
This group of crossovers will be given special attention. If it is found that the outcome for this 
group is lower than expected, an “on-treatment evaluation” will be performed. 
9 The following parameters will be estimated and used as outcome measures; proportion of job-
holders and the income distribution of the experimental subjects. IFAU – Public or private job matching for immigrant workers  13
evaluation is also aiming at producing knowledge about the importance of the 




The basic idea to improve placement services for immigrants evolved from the 
work on a government bill in 1998. The Ministry of industry, employment and 
communications formed a working party for the project in May 1999. The Min-
istry of finance, the National labour market board and the Office of labour 
market policy evaluation were invited to participate together with the ministry 
of industry, employment and communications. The choice of method (social 
experiment) was the result of discussions in this group. 
It should be observed that there is a potential conflict of objects present in 
the design of this activity. The design which is the best to permit a good 
evaluation does not necessarily need to be the best if the purpose is to “reach 
good results”, even if it is unclear what this means in the absence of a complete 
evaluation. In our suggested design the possibilities to evaluate the effects have 
been the guiding principle. The above mentioned potential conflict of interests 
is still perhaps only superficial. If we by this experiment get strong indications 
that the private company is more effective in placement service for immigrants 
in the Swedish labour market, then this knowledge should form the basis for a 
new more effective future policy. 
What would be the recommended policy given this result? The experiment 
will test a quite specific hypothesis, which is whether recruitment companies 
can help more quickly in matching jobs than the existing public employment 
office. The recommended policy would therefore be to offer unemployed im-
migrant workers placement services through recruitment companies instead ofIFAU –– Public or private job matching for immigrant workers   14
the public employment office. Alternatively, it would be to encourage the pub-
lic employment offices to learn from the recruitment companies.
10,11  
Finally, we note that the involvement of many parties in the early planning 
process has been advantageous for the project. In social experiments there 
might be a risk that the project evolves in one direction and that it is difficult to 
reverse it for political reasons. With researchers involved, planning can focus 
on the evaluation issues from the very beginning and the need for fast answers 
to major issues can be balanced to the demand for scientific rigour. It is thus 
our belief that the early involvement of labour market researchers in this pro-
ject can serve as an example for future projects. 
                                                      
10 Note, however, that the experiment will test only the outcome during the first five months of 
unemployment and exclude the impact of regular labour market programs. 
11 An observed difference in ability can either be due to economics of scope, i.e. that private of-
fices are better in job matching because they are also into staffing, or to a difference in technical 
efficiency. The design of the experiment has been guided by the intention to find out if the two 
competitors perform differently, and not why. In drawing conclusions from the experiment the is-
sue of why they perform differently might still be important. It affects both how one should mod-
ify public offices, and whether only staffing firms should be considered in a privatisation. Thus, 
data will be collected to try to find out why the competitors might perform differently.     IFAU – Public or private job matching for immigrant workers  15
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